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Abstract
The Parties to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change continue their
efforts to forge a new binding international
agreement by 2015. This article proposes to
adapt international negotiations to allow for
hybrid price and quantity-based commitments.
The economic risks surrounding target-only
commitments—the current approach—are
enormous. Combining a clear cumulative
emissions target with price-based limits on the
cost associated with achieving that target
would reduce those risks, ensure that commit-
ments by Parties remain feasible and reduce
the chance that the agreement would collapse.
Moreover, we argue that adding prices into the
agreement offers transparent and verifiable
assurance of the comparability of effort across
countries. Finally, we also show that it is pos-
sible to calculate ‘carbon price equivalents’ of
quantity-based climate commitments in a con-
ceptually similar way to the tariff equivalents
used in international trade negotiations.
Key words: climate policy, uncertainty, price
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1. Introduction: The Policy Problem
Parties to the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) met in
Warsaw in late 2013 to continue the process of
forging a new binding international agreement
to be completed by 2015. As talks stumbled
from Copenhagen in December 2009 through
subsequent meetings in Cancun, Durban and
Doha, it has become increasingly clear that
countries are moving away from the targets
and timetables approach towards more dispa-
rate national actions. The negotiation frame-
work, though, is still largely stuck in the
mindset of the Kyoto Protocol. This article
offers a way forward that builds on what has
been achieved so far but also takes into
account the desire of countries to adopt differ-
entiated national strategies. Moreover, it pro-
vides a transparent mechanism for evaluating
the comparability of efforts to reduce global
emissions.
The UNFCCC’s (2007) Bali Plan of Action
calls for the next agreement to ensure the
‘comparability of efforts’ across developed
countries while ‘taking into account differ-
ences in their national circumstances’. Trends
in national emissions and economic growth
vary widely between countries, as do year-to-
year fluctuations around those trends. This
means that achieving similar reductions rela-
tive to historical base years can require very
different levels of efforts in different countries.
These differences have greatly hampered
climate cooperation because they mean that
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commitments that are similar in effort look
inequitable. Further, divergent underlying
trends make it difficult to know the effort that
any particular commitment will require. The
failure of the G-8 to set a base year for its
agreed 80 per cent reduction of emissions by
2050 illustrates the contention in formulating
even collective targets.
The presumption that binding commitments
can take only the form of a percentage reduc-
tion relative to historical levels has dimmed the
long-term prospects for stabilising the climate.
Given the uncertainties surrounding climate
change, quantity-based targets are inefficient
relative to price-based policies.1 Moreover,
quantity-based approaches alienate rapidly
industrialising countries, such as China and
India, which have been reluctant to commit to
rigid emissions limits. Parties could negotiate
emissions levels rather than reductions relative
to base years, but even then they are not
assured of comparable efforts because many
things that affect the burden of achieving the
target can happen between the year of negotia-
tion and the commitment period. The recent
financial crisis and global economic downturn
are clear reminders of the volatility in the
underlying economic environment. Additional
uncertainties include unanticipated economic
growth, technology breakthroughs, changes in
the prices for renewables and natural gas (a
lower emitting alternative to coal), and politi-
cal instability. Finally, to properly protect
the climate, the international regime should
endure through any number of economic and
political fluctuations.
The Copenhagen Accord, adopted in
December 2009 at the Fifteenth Conference of
the Parties to the UNFCCC, breaks away from
the targets and timetables approach by allow-
ing each country to choose its own base year
and to express its commitment in terms other
than absolute reductions in emissions. This
flexibility promoted consensus and allowed an
agreement to be reached. At the same time,
however, it complicated comparisons of the
economic efforts implicit in the commitments
made by the participants: a target that appears
tight might be easy to achieve for a country
growing slowly while an apparently loose
target might be very difficult to achieve for a
country growing rapidly.
To illustrate the disparities between the
apparent and actual stringency of commit-
ments, in McKibbin et al. (2011)2 we com-
pared the level of effort necessary to achieve
the Copenhagen commitments using the
G-Cubed model of the global economy. We
projected baseline population and productivity
growth by region and computed the cost of
each country’s commitment assuming that
controls focused on fossil fuel-related CO2 and
that targets were achieved domestically (no
international offsets, for example). The results
show that alternative ways of expressing a
commitment can make a single set of targets
appear strikingly different in stringency. More-
over, they show that the actual stringency of
the accord, as measured by either gross domes-
tic product (GDP) or consumption loss relative
to a reference case, differs sharply across
countries. This is because the economic con-
sequences of each target depend importantly
on a number of factors: the size of each coun-
try’s economy in 2020; the internal structure of
its economy; the extent to which carbon-
intensive energy sources are a critical part of
the energy system in 2020; the endowment of
fossil fuels in each economy; and the ease or
difficulty of substituting between energy
sources for energy-intensive goods in produc-
tion and consumption bundles. All of these
factors affect the ambition embodied in the
accord’s commitments.
Commitments by Japan and Europe imply
high carbon prices and relatively high GDP
losses. The United States and China both have
moderate carbon prices and moderate GDP
effects. We also found that for many countries,
1. The literature on the importance of uncertainty in the
choice of quantity versus price-based instruments began
with the seminal work of Weitzman (1974), and Roberts
and Spence (1976). The nature of the uncertainty involved
in climate change suggests that a price-based approach
would be most efficient (see McKibbin and Wilcoxen
2002, and Pizer 1999, 2002).
2. Jotzo (2011) uses a different methodology but reaches
similar conclusions on the stringency of Copenhagen
targets using a range of benchmarks.
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the domestic price on carbon is a poor predic-
tor of the welfare implications of the overall
agreement. For example, the United States has
the third highest estimated carbon price but
nearly no loss of consumption. On the other
hand, Australia and Eastern Europe/Former
Soviet Union have relatively large GDP effects
despite small or zero carbon prices because
their terms of trade decline. The Organization
of the Petroleum Exporting Countries suffers a
large drop in GDP from a sharp decline in
world oil demand.
The main conclusion from McKibbin et al.
(2011) is that it is possible to calculate ‘carbon
price equivalents’ of climate commitments in a
conceptually similar way to the tariff equiva-
lents used in international trade negotiations.
For example, our methodology could be used
to compute a carbon price equivalent to the
Obama Administration’s corporate average
fuel economy increases or the US Environ-
mental Protection Agency’s Clean Power Plan
for existing electrical generating units. In addi-
tion, the article shows that the level of effort
involved is not at all transparent. It also shows
that the economic impacts from other coun-
tries’ commitments can have as large or larger
an effect on a country’s economic welfare as
meeting its own commitment. This argues for
greater economic transparency in the interna-
tional negotiation process, and it highlights the
potential value of allowing for price-based
commitments.
2. How to Get from Kyoto to a New
2015 Agreement
Here we offer a way forward. Parties could
break the stalemate around hard targets and
ensure the comparability of efforts by supple-
menting commitments on emissions with com-
mitments for price signals on carbon. Under
our proposal, all major Parties would need to
show at least a minimum level of effort regard-
less of whether they achieve their emissions
target, and they would be allowed to exceed
their target if they are unable to achieve it in
spite of undertaking a high level of effort.
Specifically, in addition to a cumulative
emissions target for the 2015–2020 period,
major economies would agree to a ‘price
collar’ on emissions in their domestic
economy that comprised:
• a starting floor price on a ton of carbon
dioxide equivalent emissions for 2015;
• a starting price ceiling on a ton of carbon
dioxide equivalent emissions for 2015; and
• a schedule for real increases in the price
floor and ceiling, such as 4 per cent per year.
The floor and ceiling prices need not be
uniform across countries as long as all Parties
were comfortable with any differences. To
comply with their commitments, Parties must
demonstrate two things. First, they must show
that they have imposed a price on carbon
equivalent emissions at least at the agreed floor
price to an agreed extent, for example over
most or all of the commitment period across all
or most of their domestic economy. Second,
Parties must show that their cumulative emis-
sions are no higher than their announced target
or that their domestic price on emissions has
reached or exceeded the ceiling price to an
agreed extent.
As shown in the many papers on price
collars,3 this price-based framework has
several advantages. It allows Parties to negoti-
ate explicit bounds on the level of effort they
undertake, ensuring that all Parties’ efforts are
serious and that no country’s commitment is
infeasible. It also makes comparing effort
across countries more transparent, and it
greatly simplifies compliance for Parties that
choose a tax on greenhouse gas emissions as
their primary domestic climate policy.4 Parties
with cap-and-trade systems can choose a
ceiling price that would have no effect as long
as the level of effort required to achieve their
emissions target is what they expect.
The price floor ensures that no Party’s com-
mitment is unduly lax, as were the targets for
the former Soviet countries under the Kyoto
3. See Burtraw et al. (2010), Fell et al. (2012), Fell and
Morgenstern (2010), Jacoby and Ellerman (2004),
Lopomo et al. (2011), Stavins and Olmstead (2006) and
Wood and Jotzo (2011).
4. Nordhaus (2006) and more recently Weitzman (2013)
have been strong advocates for a uniform international
carbon tax.
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Protocol. To the extent that Parties adopt
similar price signals, the approach helps lower
the overall cost of achieving a particular level
of climate protection by equalising marginal
abatement costs across economies. Competi-
tive concerns could provide some incentive to
converge over the long run.
The upper bound on required effort in our
proposal allows Parties to comply with their
commitments even if their targets turn out to
be unexpectedly stringent. On one hand, this
could lower the expected environmental per-
formance of the agreement for any given set of
targets, since some may not be achieved. On
the other hand, since it reduces the risk of very
high carbon prices, it could encourage Parties
to take more ambitious targets than they
otherwise would. Finally, it also helps keep
Parties within the agreement when unexpected
stringency might cause them to drop out of a
pure system of targets and timetables.
Allowing price-based commitments under a
UNFCCC agreement could have special advan-
tages for the United States. If the United States
adopts a carbon tax as part of a broader fiscal
reform package, the tax level in that legislation
could offer the United States a way to partici-
pate in a binding international commitment.
Conversely, making a carbon tax part of a treaty
commitment could bolster the long-run viabil-
ity of the tax domestically because it would
make it harder for the Congress to unravel.
In our proposed approach, Parties can
implement their commitments as they see fit
domestically, including through a tax or cap-
and-trade system that provides transparent
price signals. The domestic mechanics of the
price collar could work in a number of ways
within a cap-and-trade system. For example, a
‘central bank of carbon’ could intervene by
buying or selling permits to keep the price
within bounds.5 This is similar to the open
market operations of the US Federal Reserve
in short-term money markets. Alternatively,
the government could place a reserve price on
allowances that it auctions and offer additional
permits at a price no lower than the agreed
ceiling value. Parties could control any rev-
enues generated by their domestic climate
policy and use it to offset other tax burdens as
they see fit. The effects of these domestic pro-
grams would be measurable, reportable and
verifiable much earlier in the commitment
period than emissions levels, giving an early
indication of treaty compliance.
The flexibility of a price-based commitment
is especially well suited to developing countries
that are uncomfortable with hard emissions
caps but might be open to imposing a carbon tax
or a cap-and-trade system with a safety valve,
for example. One option would be to allow such
countries to begin by adopting a price floor
alone, without an explicit emissions target, and
then later transition to commitments more like
those of industrialised countries.
Establishing comparable national price
targets across countries means that interna-
tional trading of permits would be unneces-
sary, adding to the system’s robustness by
avoiding a fragile international regime based
on a common allowance market. McKibbin
and Wilcoxen (2002) and McKibbin et al.
(2009a) explain the advantages of coordinated
national institutions over global institutions for
creating a robust policy regime.
Some environmentalists are uncomfortable
with a price collar approach, believing that an
upper limit on the price of allowances under-
mines the environmental integrity of the com-
mitment. However, the absence of a price cap
does not guarantee that tight targets will be
adopted and achieved. If Parties can only adopt
hard targets as commitments, then they may
choose looser caps or none at all rather than
risk excessive stringency or non-compliance.
Moreover, without an explicit upper bound on
prices, unexpectedly high compliance costs
could lead to a disorderly collapse of a domes-
tic or international trading program, perhaps
the worst possible outcome for the environ-
ment. A price collar, in contrast, would limit
compliance costs and reduce the likelihood of
a collapse.
Others argue against putting an upper limit
on carbon prices on the grounds that very high
carbon prices could spur technologies that will
5. For example, this is a core feature of the McKibbin–
Wilcoxen hybrid approach (see McKibbin and Wilcoxen
1997, 2002).
Price Mechanisms in Climate Negotiations 603
© 2014 The Authors. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies
published by Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University
eventually provide low cost abatement, thus
obviating the apparent cost savings of a limit
on carbon prices.6 Clearly, a limit that is lower
than the expected carbon price can discourage
investment in abating technologies relative
to the case without the limit. However, by
establishing a price floor as well as a price
ceiling—at appropriate levels—a price collar
both prevents the collapse of the program and
limits the downside risk for investors in low
carbon technologies. Both factors reduce
uncertainty, and hence risk, for investors in
abatement technologies. Without a price collar,
carbon prices will be more volatile and invest-
ment will be more risky as a result. Finally, the
economic literature has long emphasised that
gradual and predictable price increases for
emissions lead to cost-minimising long-term
abatement.
Several practical details would need to be
resolved for our proposal to be implemented.
First, the UNFCCC would have to develop
guidelines on how countries could demon-
strate compliance with an agreed carbon price
range. This would include methods of verify-
ing price signals and quantifying the extent to
which they were in effect (both over time and
across sectors of the economy). The treaty
must also provide rules to ensure that excess
emissions are reasonably proportional to the
degree to which the price ceiling binds (that is,
a brief period at the ceiling should not be used
to justify large excess emissions). Key vari-
ables that could be used for this purpose
include the duration over which the price
ceiling applies, the share of total allowances
the government sells at the ceiling price, or the
share of emissions taxed at that rate or higher.
For example, justifying high excess emissions
might require a long duration of prices at the
ceiling and/or a relatively large share of emis-
sions that are taxed.
Second, regulatory (non-price) climate poli-
cies, such as low-carbon fuel standards, would
require special rules to determine their price
equivalents. The UNFCCC could develop
methodologies to calculate a shadow price on
emissions analogous to the way the World
Trade Organization converts trade protection
policies into tariff equivalents. Parties could
count towards their price signals any existing
fossil energy taxes, but such credit would have
to be net of any subsidies to fossil energy or
other greenhouse gas-emitting activities.
In our approach, the price floor ensures that
no party can use terrestrial sinks or
government-financed offsets alone to meet its
commitments. However, the agreement should
specify how Parties will account for land-
based carbon stock changes when targets are
set. Another important element of the agree-
ment is the level of technology transfer and
financial assistance to developing countries.
Given the complexity of developed country
commitments, our view is that these issues are
best handled separately from the target-setting
negotiations.
3. An Illustrative Price Collar for the
United States
To illustrate how a price collar could work,
we now draw on McKibbin et al. (2009b), in
which we constructed several representative
climate policy scenarios using the G-Cubed
intertemporal general equilibrium model, a
widely used model of the global economy.
First, we established a ‘reference scenario’ that
reflects our best estimate of the likely evolu-
tion of each region’s economy based on the
relationship between economic growth and
emissions growth in the regions over the last
decade. The reference scenario also included
the effects of climate policies already
announced or implemented by governments
other than the United States.
The first US policy scenario we present is an
illustrative target path for US emissions. This
approximates the Obama Administration’s
early 2009 proposed targets for 2020 and 2050
of 14 per cent and 83 per cent reductions,
respectively, from 2005 emissions levels.
Details appear in table 4 of McKibbin et al.
(2009c). The scenario assumes a cap-and-trade
program with a linear path of emissions caps
from 2012 to 2020, and then another linear
path from 2020 to 2050. It requires the United
States to hit each year’s emission target6. See, for example, Driesen (2002).
Asia & the Pacific Policy Studies September 2014604
© 2014 The Authors. Asia and the Pacific Policy Studies
published by Wiley Publishing Asia Pty Ltd and Crawford School of Public Policy at The Australian National University
exactly, with no flexibility about when the
emissions reductions would occur. Also, the
scenario includes no offsets or other cost con-
tainment provisions. Although cap-and-trade
legislation is no longer under discussion and
the proposals that were under consideration at
the time were more flexible, this stylised sce-
nario is useful because it produces a price path
that can illustrate how the price collar could
work.
In our second scenario, we supplement the
targets with a price floor and ceiling that are
$10 and $35, respectively, per ton of CO2
emissions in 2012, both rising at 4 per cent
annually. Figure 1 shows the allowance prices
that emerge in the two scenarios. The dashed
path labelled ‘without collar’ is the equilib-
rium price of a ton of carbon dioxide if the
economy is required to achieve the emissions
targets year by year, without allowing banking,
borrowing or offsets. The shaded region shows
the range between the price floor and price
ceiling. The solid line labelled ‘with collar’
shows the price that would prevail with the
collar in place. This and the ‘without collar’
curve coincide in the range between the price
floor and the price ceiling.
The price floor is triggered briefly at the
start, during which time the government would
remove some permits from the market. Over
the subsequent decade, the permit price stays
within the price collar. By 2023, strong
demand for permits causes the market price to
hit the ceiling and the government offers addi-
tional permits at the ceiling price (this is
similar to the McKibbin & Wilcoxen, 2002,
hybrid proposal). By 2042, the price ceiling
has become high enough that it rises above the
market price of allowances. At that point, no
extra permits are sold and emissions no longer
exceed the annual cap.
Figure 2 shows annual US CO2 emissions
for the two scenarios. Under both policies,
emissions fall in every year. With the price
collar in place, emissions fall somewhat more
slowly when the ceiling is binding. The addi-
tional emissions allowed by the extra permits
are shown by the shaded area.
Figure 3 shows the effects of both scenarios
on cumulative US emissions through 2050.
Both reduce emissions substantially relative to
the reference scenario and are generally very
similar. In this example, introducing the price
collar increases projected cumulative emis-
sions through 2050 by about 4 per cent, or 6
billion metric tons, relative to the cap-and-
trade scenario without the price collar.
However, by imposing an upper bound on
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compliance costs, the collar increases the net
present value of personal consumption (a
measure of welfare) by $80 billion relative to
the scenario without the collar.
The cap-and-trade legislation considered by
the US Congress in 2009 included an impor-
tant additional provision known as ‘banking’
that allows firms to save unused allowances.
Banking provides an incentive for firms to
abate more in earlier years than is absolutely
necessary in order save some of their permits
for future years when emissions caps are
tighter. To examine the relationship between
banking and a price collar, we constructed a
third policy scenario in which firms were
required to achieve the same cumulative emis-
sions as the first simulation (without the price
collar) but were allowed to bank emissions
when it was profitable to do so.
Figure 4 compares the estimated price tra-
jectory of carbon allowances under the
banking scenario (the dashed curve labelled
‘with banking’) to that for the price collar case
(the solid curve labelled ‘with collar’). Each
scenario includes only one of the two mecha-
nisms: no price collar is imposed in the
banking case and banking is not allowed in the
price collar case. From 2012 through 2023, the
price collar case lies below the banking case,
indicating that the original emissions targets
are relatively loose during the first decade. If
permitted to do so, firms would want to do
more abatement in order to bank allowances.
The reduced number of allowances available
for contemporaneous use would drive up the
equilibrium price to the level shown by the
‘with banking’ curve.
From 2023 on, however, the two curves are
essentially identical. Both rise at the interest
rate until 2042 and after that they follow the
original price trajectory. The reason the curves
are similar is that our price collar is designed
to be very similar to the cost-minimising path.7
Had the initial price ceiling been higher, say
$36 per ton, the two curves would have
crossed; the collar trajectory would have risen
above the banking path.
By design, the banking scenario achieves
the same cumulative emissions target as the
original scenario (6 billion metric tons more
abatement than the price collar case). As
shown in Figure 5, the additional abatement
occurs entirely during the first decade, when
emissions are lower in the banking case than
the price collar case (the shaded region in the
figure). In subsequent years, allowance prices
and annual emissions are equal in the two
simulations.
A policy combining banking with a price
collar would have the advantageous features of
both. As long as no macroeconomic surprises
occur, banking allows firms to manage their
abatement efficiently and thereby minimise the
overall cost of achieving the desired emissions
reductions. As long as the price collar is
set—as it was above—so that the expected
market price and the ceiling are consistently
very close, there would be little or no incentive
7. See McKibbin et al. (2009b) for discussion on the rela-
tionship between the banking and cost-minimising paths.
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for firms to purchase additional allowances
from the government. However, if unexpected
events make abatement more difficult than
expected, the price ceiling would come into
effect, providing protection against sharp
spikes in allowance prices. Moreover, our
illustrative results above suggest that the con-
sequent increase in cumulative emissions
would be very modest.
4. Conclusion
The move towards heterogeneous national
commitments is a very positive step forward
for climate policy. However, this development
requires adapting international negotiations to
allow for price-based commitments. At the
same time, ‘price equivalence’ provides a
mechanism for comparing national effort.
Incorporating a price collar into a framework
focused on long-run cumulative emissions
targets is an effective and politically viable
way to move international negotiations on
climate policy forward. The economic uncer-
tainty surrounding target commitments is
enormous, and combining a clear cumulative
emissions target with a price collar optimally
balances the environmental objective with
the need to ensure that commitments remain
feasible. Using plausible assumptions, the
example in this article illustrates how a price
collar does this.
Focusing exclusively on reductions from
historical emissions as the only meaningful
form of commitment has greatly hampered
negotiations on climate commitments, espe-
cially for developing countries where uncer-
tainty about the future and the cost of
inadvertent stringency is greatest. In contrast,
the price collar can ease Parties into the system
by allowing them to adopt only a price floor in
the early years. It also offers a transparent and
verifiable assurance of the comparability of
effort across countries. Further, Parties can
design price collars so that they have no effect
if predictions about the level of effort required
to achieve a target are correct. Incorporating
price-based commitments into the treaty along
with an emissions goal also demonstrates
compliance during, as well as after, the com-
mitment period.
August 2014.
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